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6 April 1960

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

6 April 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK
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USSR-China: [In an unpublished speech during a February meeting of bloc leaders in Moscow, Khrushchev is reported to have attacked Chinese policies and actions in strong terms, accusing Peiping of endangering bloc unity. By criticizing Peiping before this audience, Khrushchev probably hoped to forestall any influence Peiping's independent views might have on the actions of satellite regimes and to make clear that the USSR would not change its policies to mollify the Chinese.] 25X1

NO
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USSR-Greece: [The Soviet ambassador in Athens has told the Greek Foreign Ministry that Greece's "generally hostile attitude" toward the USSR made it difficult to expand economic relations at this time and that the visit of the Soviet foreign trade minister, scheduled for April, had been postponed until July or August. Foreign Minister Averoff feels that the USSR probably has not given up its economic offensive, but has merely postponed its main trade offers until a more suitable occasion. Moscow may hope that developments at the summit meeting in May will induce Greece to join in the "spirit of detente" and, coupled with offers to absorb surplus Greek commodities, pave the way for a weakening of Athens' pro-Western policies.] 25X1
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NO
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USSR-France: [The German question remained the major point of disagreement between De Gaulle and Khrushchev in their final talks as it had been in their initial conversations. Khrushchev expressed approval of De Gaulle's Algerian policy, but was non-committal on De Gaulle's ideas for joint East-West aid to less-developed countries and for noninterference in internal affairs of other countries. Khrushchev made a considerable point of Moscow's good relations with China, but did not suggest that France]

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recognize Peiping. De Gaulle found Khrushchev clever, intelligent, and well-informed, but not of Stalin's stature.]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Africa: The South African Government has intensified its campaign to suppress African unrest. Police are using strong-arm methods in several cities to "intimidate the intimidators" who allegedly were responsible for the recent work stoppage. The aim of the police, according to a ranking officer, is to stamp out African nationalist organizations for all time.

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Guinea: [The financial situation in Guinea appears to be worsening following Conakry's recent severance of monetary relations with the French franc zone and issuance of a new national currency. Confidence in the new Guinea franc is not developing; it is being discounted up to 50 percent in West African capitals and is not gaining acceptance in Guinea's northern region.]

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Laos:

the Pathet Lao insurgents plan armed attacks on American personnel in the Pakse region of southern Laos some time before the 24 April elections. The Pathet Lao probably have the capability for such action, but it would seem to run counter to present Communist tactics in connection with the elections.]

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III. THE WEST

OK
Cuba: Delegates from the Sino-Soviet bloc and from Latin American nations are now in Havana for the Fourth National Congress of the Youth Section of the Cuban Communist party, which began on 4 April and is scheduled to last a week. The congress has been given TV time and other facilities by the Castro regime. The Communists are also preparing a Latin American Youth Congress for later this year, which would ostensibly be under non-Communist "democratic" leadership.

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[REDACTED]
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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[REDACTED]
Khrushchev Attack on Chinese Communist Policies

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] an unpublished Khrushchev speech to bloc leaders on 4 February attacked recent Chinese actions and attitudes in strong terms. In a speech to the Warsaw Pact meeting, China's "observer" had expressed views on many policy matters which directly contradicted those of Khrushchev; Peiping broadcast this speech immediately, but it was the only bloc capital to do so.

[The leaders of all Communist countries heard Khrushchev condemn China because its actions had endangered the unity which the bloc must preserve in its relations with non-Communist countries. Khrushchev criticized the uncompromising attitude adopted by the Chinese toward Yugoslavia, on the grounds that their persistent attacks created disunity among socialist nations.]

[He complained that Peiping had refused to support the USSR's attempts to reduce world tension and to follow Moscow's lead in reducing its armed forces. He alleged that Chinese actions on the Indian border had created tension during a period of international detente, thereby forfeiting much support for the Communist cause in the neutralist countries of Asia.]

[The core of Khrushchev's criticism was that China was too insistent on following its own independent policies. He claimed that Peiping's refusal to associate itself with policies adopted by other socialist countries, by which Khrushchev meant the Soviet Union, was harming the cause of international communism. Khrushchev probably hoped that his open and harsh criticism of Peiping at this meeting would forestall any influence China's independent views might have on the actions of other satellite regimes and would make clear that the Soviet Union did not intend to change its policies to mollify the Chinese.] [REDACTED]

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USSR Rebukes Greece for "Hostile" Attitude

[Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev has postponed until July or August the visit to Greece originally scheduled for April. Soviet Ambassador Sergeyev, informing Athens of the delay, stated that the Karamanlis government's unwillingness to put relations on a "friendlier" basis and its "generally hostile attitude" toward the USSR make it difficult to expand economic relations at this time.]

[Greek Foreign Minister Averoff believes that the USSR has not abandoned its general economic offensive, but merely decided to put off its main trade offers until it can take advantage of a more receptive or a more vulnerable atmosphere in Greece.]

[Most of the bloc's efforts over the past several months to establish closer political, cultural, and economic ties with Greece have been rebuffed. In February, Sergeyev complained to Foreign Minister Averoff of Athens' indifference to Soviet efforts to achieve an international detente and the refusal of top Greek officials to accept an invitation to visit the USSR. Last fall, Greece refused to expand cultural exchanges and denied the USSR's request for air service routes through Athens. Greece has also been cool to Moscow's attempts to increase trade and has rejected recent overtures by the USSR's Balkan satellites to promote greater regional cooperation in creating an atom-free zone in the Balkans and in convoking a Balkan-Adriatic summit conference.]

[Soviet leaders may hope that developments at the summit meeting in May will induce Greece to join in the "spirit of detente" and, coupled with favorable offers to absorb surplus Greek commodities, pave the way for a weakening of Athens' firmly pro-Western policies.]

[The postponing of the visit coincides with the announcement by Athens of a trial of 14 Greek Communists accused of espionage on behalf of the USSR, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania. On 4 April the Albanian Government protested to the United Nations about an alleged Greek border violation and complained of Greece's "hostility" toward Albanian efforts to improve relations.]

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[REDACTED]
Khrushchev - De Gaulle Talks [REDACTED]

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[The German question remained the major point of disagreement in the second series of private conversations between De Gaulle and Khrushchev, according to French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. The Soviet premier repeated his threat to sign a separate peace treaty if he fails to obtain agreement on a treaty with both German states. De Gaulle countered by rejecting any recognition of East Germany and stressing that there was no reason to upset the status quo.]

[Khrushchev endorsed De Gaulle's view that disarmament should begin with both a cessation of nuclear tests and an agreement to convert stocks of nuclear weapons. He expressed approval of De Gaulle's Algerian policy, but was noncommittal on the French leader's ideas for joint East-West aid to underdeveloped countries and for acceptance of the concept of noninterference in internal affairs of any other countries. Apparently in response to De Gaulle's publicly stated views regarding Sino-Soviet differences, Khrushchev made a "considerable point" of Moscow's continuing good relations with Peiping.]

[In preparing the communiqué at the end of the visit, France insisted on inserting a reference to "progressive settlement" of the question of Germany and Berlin, but refused to include a more explicit definition of a European security "system"--which it felt might indicate the Rapacki plan or a Warsaw-NATO nonaggression pact. Discussions on trade, cultural, and scientific exchanges were included at Khrushchev's insistence in order to demonstrate that the talks covered a wide range of subjects.]

[De Gaulle found Khrushchev clever, intelligent, and well-informed, but not of Stalin's stature. In a television broadcast on 4 April, Premier Debré took pains to state that Khrushchev's final speech on TV was required by "the laws of hospitality" and that the visit was a necessary step in preparation for the summit. He used the occasion also to deny that the communiqué was "of meager substance," to state that "absolute priority" must be given to disarmament, and that the West cannot be asked to abandon its position on Germany and Berlin as a prerequisite to a detente.] [REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Africa Increases Repression

The South African Government has intensified its campaign to suppress African unrest. Police are using strong-arm methods in several cities in an "intimidation of the intimidators" they consider responsible for the recent African demonstrations and the widespread native work stoppage. More than 400 persons have been arrested under the emergency regulations of 30 March and 2 April. A bill authorizing the government to outlaw African organizations was passed by parliament on 5 April. A police official has stated privately that the aim of the security forces is to stamp out African nationalist groups "for all time."

The African labor situation has returned to normal in most parts of the Union. However, the week-long stoppage, which caused an estimated \$60 million loss to the South African economy, demonstrated to both Africans and Europeans the potential leverage of the African community. The native labor force will probably be subjected on an ever-increasing scale to conflicting pressures from nationalist agitators and security forces, with a concomitant rise in tension. []

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Guinea Faces Economic Difficulties

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Guinea's abrupt severance of its monetary ties with the French franc zone on 1 March in favor of a new national currency without substantial backing has contributed to a worsening of economic conditions in the country. Confidence in the new Guinean franc has not developed as Conakry anticipated. It is being discounted up to 50 percent in West African capitals and is not gaining full acceptance within the country--particularly in the northern region, which has considerable trade with neighboring French Community states.]

[In addition, widespread food shortages have developed. These are reported to have precipitated a number of disturbances in food shops as well as some expressions of dissatisfaction with President Touré's authoritarian regime.]

[Smuggling of reserves out of the country by some of the remaining private firms is a further factor in the country's weakening economic position. These largely French-owned firms, which have had their business activities progressively restricted by the economic controls imposed by the government, fear that outright nationalization of their property may be in the offing.]

[The Guinea Government, aware of the need to bolster its sagging economy and stabilize its weak currency, may turn to the Communist bloc for further assistance.]

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Pathet Lao Reportedly Planning Armed Attacks on Americans
In Southern Laos

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[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] The Pathet Lao intend to mount armed attacks on American personnel in the Pakse area of southern Laos some time before the 24 April Laotian national elections. Pakse is a major government administrative center in southern Laos. There are about 20 American officials in Pakse, including USIS and USOM officers and a small military contingent attached to the Fourth Military Region Headquarters in implementation of the Franco-American joint training agreement.]

[The Pathet Lao have the capability of launching terroristic attacks on foreigners in this area, where a Roman Catholic missionary was assassinated a few months ago. Such action would be inconsistent with present Communist tactics. The Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) has entered nine candidates in the race and is posing in its propaganda as the victim of army depredations and efforts by the government to rig the elections. Its 4 April appeal to the Geneva co-chairmen to intervene to assure free elections calls the present electoral arrangements "farfical," and charges that the reformist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI) is scheming to "discard the candidates of the Neo Lao Hak Sat party and to pursue its policy of civil war and downright oppression."]

[While this statement may be merely another NLHS attempt to generate international pressures on the government to hold free elections, it might be intended as the groundwork for an eleventh-hour NLHS withdrawal from the elections and an intensification of Pathet Lao guerrilla warfare. Attacks on Americans might accompany any such switch in tactics.] [redacted]

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III. THE WEST

Communist Youth Congress Under Way in Cuba

The Fourth National Congress of the youth section of the Popular Socialist (Communist) party of Cuba, which opened in Havana on 4 April, has drawn delegates from the Soviet Union, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and a number of other Soviet bloc countries as well as from various parts of Latin America. The congress, which is to last a week, opened with a rally broadcast over the government-operated television and radio networks. "American imperialism" was the major target of the opening rally, and the central theme was defense of the Cuban revolution.

Preparations are being made for an ostensibly non-Communist Latin American Youth Congress which is to be held in Cuba, reportedly next July. Anti-Communist youth groups are interested in this congress, but it is expected that it will be manipulated by Communists. A Cuban mission, headed by a close associate of Raul Castro, arrived in Venezuela on 1 April on the first leg of a Latin American tour to invite youth groups to attend preparatory sessions for the youth congress to be held in Havana beginning on 25 April.

The Communist youth activities in Cuba are only one indication of the extent to which the Castro regime is lending itself to furtherance of world Communist objectives in Latin America. A Latin American "peace" conference is planned in Cuba in May or June, and plans for a Latin American peoples' conference to "create the apparatus to fight the common enemy, imperialism," were announced on 26 March by a pro-Communist Cuban labor leader. [REDACTED]

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Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
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The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

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